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The double-digit  inflation rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s were 
extraordinarily high by American  standards.  The costs associated with  this 
inflation  were judged to be too high.  Political recognition  of these costs led 
the Federal Reserve, with the support of the Carter administration, to begin 
tightening  monetary  policy. The disinflationary  policy  was successful,  and since 
1982 the inflation rate  has averaged about 4  percent.  However,  many have  blamed 
this policy for bringing about the 1981-82  recession,  the worst since the Great 
Depression. 
Nevertheless, many would not hesitate to say that the United States is 
better off today with the lower inflation rate of around 4  percent.  If the 
nation is indeed better off, it is natural to ask whether a move from 4  percent 
inflation to zero  would be worth the costs of a  possible recession. Howitt (1990) 
makes a persuasive case that zero inflation is probably the best inflation rate 
to inherit,  but his analysis  of the transition  costs leaves  him uncertain  whether 
to recommend going all the way to zero.  Aiyagari (1990) compares the costs of 
going to zero from a 5  percent inflation trend with the benefits of being there 
and concludes  that the costs exceed the benefits.  In  this paper,  we present some 
simple  calculations to explain  why we think that the benefits of achieving price 
stability would exceed the transition costs. 
One benefit of zero inflation is the value of the extra real cash balances 
people wouldhold  at alower inflation rate.  This  benefit is sometimes referred 
to as the "shoe-leather"  savings  because,  in  a simple  money demand model,  holding 
larger amounts of cash saves shoe leather that would be worn down in making 
additional  trips  to  the  bank.  Because  inflation acts  as  a  tax  on cash, 
individuals spend time and resources (shoe leather) trying to economize on the 
cash they hold.  Banks benefit if inflation is zero  because reserves do not earn 
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the shoe-leather  costs so small relative to other costs of inflation that they 
should not be considered by po1icymakers.l  Other economists believe that the 
welfare loss arising from a recession caused by tight monetary policy is so large 
that it swamps all the benefits associated with zero inflation.= 
In this paper, we  show that  the  loss associated with  a money-induced 
recession is actually of the same order of magnitude as the gain attributable to 
reduced shoe-leather  costs if the inflation rate were reduced from 4  percent to 
zero.  This result is important because the transition costs associated with 
ending  inflation are  thought  to  be  large, capturing  the  main  cost  of  a 
disinflation policy, while the shoe-leather  costs are generally thought to be 
only a small,  insignificant share of the total costs of inflation. 
In order  to  make  such comparisons useful, the  costs and benefits  of 
reducing inflation must be in the same metric.  Ideally,  both should  be measured 
in welfare terms; that is,  how much a person would have to be compensated in 
order to be indifferent to a given policy change.  Unfortunately, this is not 
possible without a consistent model  that  explains both how disinflationary 
policies cause recessions and why people are better off with zero inflation. 
Instead,  we measure  the desirability of a zero inflation policy  in terms of 
resource costs and resource savings. 
We  begin  the  analysis  in  section  I1  by  estimating  the  costs  of  a 
disinflationary  policy.  Then,  in  section  I11  we  show  that  the  partial 
equilibrium estimates of shoe-leather  costs are equal to the value of resources 
that would be saved if the price level were stable.  This framework allows a 
quantitative comparison  of these off  setting effects.  In  section  IV,  we conclude 
with a discussion of the policy implications. 
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For  the  sake of the  argument, we  assume  that  the  transition to  zero 
inflation cannot be accomplished without causing a recession.  In theory, the 
depth of the recession caused by disinflation can be reduced (or perhaps even 
eliminated)  if  the  monetary  authorities  can make  a  credible commitment  to 
achieving price stability.  Actual losses will likely depend on the credibility 
of the Federal Reserve System, making the true costnenefit calculation of a 
prospective disinflation quite difficult.  In the absence of good information 
about the Fed's  credibility,  we assume that the transition costs of another 4 
percent disinflation would be the same as the costs incurred in the early 1980s 
when  the  Federal Reserve  engineered a 4  percent  disinflation, reducing the 
inflation trend from approximately 8 percent to 4  percent. 
The transition costs are measured as the accumulated value of consumption 
lost during the period from the beginning of the disinflation policy in 1979 
until consumption returned to its trend level in 1985.  Unlike Blinder (1990), 
we use consumption rather than output to measure the costs of disinflation.  We 
assume  that current consumption is a  sufficient  statistic  for future  output;  that 
is,  when the level of consumption returns to its long-run  trend,  we assume that 
the present discounted  value of expected  output  has also returned to its long-run 
trend.  This assumption is an implication of the permanent income hypothesis, 
which postulates that consumption is a constant fraction of permanent income 
(present discounted  value of future output).  Thus,  when consumption  returns to 
the same value that would have occurred without a recession,  so has permanent 
income or expected future output. 
To measure the present discounted  value of consumption lost  because of the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm4 
disinflation  policy,  one must know the path that consumption  would have followed 
had the policy not been adopted.  We assume that the trend in consumption  would 
have grown at a constant rate of 2.7 percent; this  is the  trend growth in 
potential GNP for the 1980s as calculated by the research staff at the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and as described in Braun (1990). 
The expected trend in the inflation rate was around 8 percent per year in 
the summer of 1979, before  the  Fed adopted the disinflation policy.  Since 
1983, inflation has averaged just over 4  percent per year.  The recession had 
ended by 1983,  but consumption  did not reach the level that would have occurred 
without the recession until 1985 (see figure 1).  In the second half of the 
decade, the  level  of  consumption spending  was  above  our  estimate  of the 
sustainable  long-run trend.  We  estimate  the  costs  of  disinflation  by 
accumulating the discounted deviations of consumption  below the trend level for 
each year until actual consumption  returned to the trend: 
where  X  is  the  present  value  of  the  consumption lost, cP,  is  the  trend 
(logarithmic) level of consumption in period t,  cat  is the actual logarithm of 
consumption in period t,  and B-l/(l+r)  is the discount rate. Assuming that the 
real interest rate was 4  percent and that the consumption trend  was 2.7 percent, 
the  present value of the  consumption lost in the early 1980s was almost 18 
percent of consumption, or 12  percent of the 1979 level of GNP. 
Table 1 shows the sensitivity of our results to alternative assumptions 
about the real interest rate and the real  consumption growth trend.  The results 
are  practically  insensitive to  alternative interest rate assumptions.  The 
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welfare losses are shown with artificial precision, out to two decimal points, 
to illustrate a difference associated with a 1/2 percentage point change in the 
real rate. The assumption  about the consumption growth trend,  on  the other hand, 
is quite important for the estimate of the transition costs.  In  the neighborhood 
of the 2.7 percent trend, each 0.1 percentage point increase in the assumed 
growth trend for consumption raises the estimate of the resource cost by about 
1 to 1-1/4  percent of GNP. 
There are several possible objections to our procedure.  First,  some have 
argued that the transition  costs  are not linear as the inflation  rate is reduced. 
They reason that going from 8 percent to 4  percent is credible,  while going from 
4  percent to zero is not.  A rationale for this argument can be found in the 
reputation equilibrium model developed by  Barro and Gordon (1983).  However, 
there is no evidence that the disinflation in the early 1980s was anticipated. 
As mentioned above,  at least one forecaster,  Data Resources Inc. (DRI),  guessed 
that inflation would average 8 percent in the 1980s.  In 1978,  Richard B. Hoey 
began surveying  decision-makers  for their 10-year  inflation  outlook. The average 
10-year-ahead  inflation expectation peaked in October 1980 at 8.82 percent. 
Second,  some have suggested that high unemployment in Europe in the 1980s 
is  evidence  that  reducing  inflation may  have  long-run effects  on output. 
However,  this experience is recent and localized and may be due to industrial 
policies or  labor laws.  In a study aimed directly at this long-run  issue, 
Boschen and Mills  (1990) find that there is no effect of monetary factors on 
permanent movements in real GNP. 
There are many reasons to  think that this procedure will overstate the 
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costs of disinflation,  because the recession of the 1980s  was clearly associated 
with many different real shocks,  including the structural  adjustments in  the auto 
and  steel  industries,  the  deregulation  in  transportation  and  financial 
industries, and  the  oil  price  shock  of  1979.  It  is  often  difficult  to 
disentangle real and monetary factors;  however,  we can use DRI's  1979 estimate 
of the impact of the oil price shock to adjust our calculations. 
One way to adjust for this shock is to adjust the trend consumption growth 
downward.  In 1979, DRI  estimated  that  the  oil  price  shock would  cause 
consumption growth to decline by 2 percent in 1980.  Consumption actually fell 
0.2  percent that year; we  assume the difference was due to monetary policy. 
After 1980,  we assume that the consumption  growth rate returns to the 2.7 percent 
trend and grows parallel to, but below, the  trend shown in figure 1.  This 
adjustment  reduces  the  estimated  resource  cost  of  the  disinflation  to 
approximately 9.7  percent of GNP. 
Our calculation  of the transition  costs  of disinflation  differs from  others 
because we measure these costs in terms of lost consumption rather than in terms 
of additional point-years  of  unemployment or in terms of lost output. A recently 
published book by Blinder (1987) reports estimates of the transition costs that 
appear to be much larger than ours.  Blinder measures output lost indirectly. 
He assumes a full-employment  rate of unemployment of  5.8  percent (the  actual rate 
in 1979)  and calculates the cost of the  disinflation as  the amount by  which 
actual unemployment exceeds 5.8 percent for the years 1980 through 1986.  He 
calculates that the disinflation resulted in 12.5 point-years  of unemployment. 
Using Blinder's estimate of  Okun's Law,  a rule of thumb relating  unemployment  and 
output,  those 12.5  point-years of unemployment are equivalent to 30 percent of 
GNP  . 
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This procedure probably overstates the cost of disinflation in two ways. 
First, the natural rate of unemployment is difficult to  estimate.  The large 
amount of sectoral reallocation that took place in the early 1980s makes  it 
likely that the natural rate was higher than 5.8 percent. 
The second way Blinder overstates the cost of the 1980-1982  recession is 
to add up lost  output  until unemployment (and,  by Okun's Law,  GNP)  returns to its 
trend level. As we discussed earlier,  however,  the costs of disinflation should 
be measured as the accumulation of deviations of consumption  from trend,  and not 
the accumulation of deviations of GNP  from trend.  Measuring lost GNP  involves 
a type of double counting.  The measure of accumulated output lost includes 
forgone investment,  which is a source of future  consumption. By accumulating the 
consumption lost in each year until the level of consumption returns to  its 
trend, we  have  implicitly  included  the  investment  that  was  lost  in  the 
recession. 
Blinder also assumes that the reduction  of inflation  in  the early 1980s  was 
6  percent, not 4  percent as we have assumed.  Thus, we may be overstating the 
costs of a 4  percent disinflation.  Assuming that inflation was reduced by 6 
percentage points  in the early 1980s and that the costs of disinflation are 
linear,  the estimated costs of reducing inflation are approximately two-thirds 
of those shown in table 1. 
Our calculations  put the costs of the 1980s disinflation  between 8  percent 
and 15 percent of GNP.  Of course these calculations are only rough estimates, 
but they indicate that,  at least for this episode,  the estimated costs of going 
to 4  percent inflation were substantial. 
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The shoe-leather  benefit of eliminating inflation is the value society 
places on the extra money balances that would be held if inflation  were expected 
to be zero.  The demand for money (see figure 2)  reflects the social value of an 
extra unit of cash balances.  If the current nominal interest rate is 8  percent 
per year,  society would value an  additional  dollar of real cash balances at  eight 
cents per year.  This value can be considered the increased utility of holding 
realbalances,  as in Sidrauski (1967),  or the reduced shoe-leather  costs,  as in 
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). 
As  is well known, the area under the demand curve for money, from the 
origin to a given quantity of money, is equal to the total value per year that 
society places on  holding that amount of real cash balances.  The shaded area 
(A+B in figure 2)  is equal to the social value of the extra real balances that 
would be held if  the  inflation rate were reduced from .rr  to zero.  Area C in 
figure 2 shows the welfare loss that remains even at zero inflation.' 
This area is a partial-equilibrium  measure of the welfare cost of zero 
inflation.  The costs of disinflation are expressed in terms of resource costs, 
however,  so that these benefits should also be expressed in similar terms.  To 
see that the traditional  measure of the welfare cost of inflation  also equals the 
amount of resources that society wastes under positive inflation, consider a 
variant of the Tobin-Baumol  model of money demand. 
Suppose individuals get paid once per month and choose  how  many times they 
wish to go to the bank in that month.  More trips allow the individual to hold 
a lower cash balance and a higher level of interest-earning assets, such as 
bonds.  With  n  trips  to  the  bank  per  period,  the  average  amount  of  an 
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individual's real cash balances (m)  is given by y/2n, where y is the amount of 
real earnings per month.  The total cost of making n trips to the bank,  C(n,y), 
depends on the income level,  y,  as well as on the number of trips to the bank, 
n.  Individuals choose n in  order to minimize the combined costs associated with 
holding currency and going to the bank: 
Total  Costs =  (r+n)  &  +C(n ,y)  ,  where  a2  C(~,Y)  1  0. 
anz 
The first term represents the opportunity cost of  holding  currency,  and the 
second term is the shoe-leather  costs incurred making trips to the bank in order 
to minimize real cash  holdings. The deadweight  loss associated  with an inflation 
rate of n is simply the total amount of resources that are spent trying to escape 
the inflation tax,  c  [n*(i=r+n) ,y]  .  The benefits of ending inflation equal the 
savings in  brokerage fees or shoe-leather  costs,  C[n*(i-r+n)  ,y]  -  C[n*(i-r)  ,y]  . 
Appendix 1 shows that this difference is equal to area A+B  in figure 2. 
To  derive  a quantitative estimate  of  the  benefits  of  going  to  zero 
inflation, we assume that the demand for real cash balances has the general 
functional form presented in Cagan (1956) and has a unitary income elasticity. 
The demand for money is given as 
Figure 2 shows that integrating equation (3)  from m,  (money demand at 
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i=r+x)  to m',  (money demand at  i-r)  gives us a framework for estimating the 
resources savedby adopting a zero inflation  policy.  The resource cost per year 
as a fraction of current GNP, b, associated with an inflation rate of .rr  (per 
year) is shown in appendix 2 to be approximately 
where V is base velocity in  a year, i is the nominal interest rate per year, and 
B  is the semi-elasticity of money demand.  We use the monetary base because it 
is  the base for the inflation tax.  Although there is  a restriction against 
paying interest on the business demand deposits in  MI, banks have long devised 
methods for paying implicit interest on these accounts.  Given the structure of 
financial regulations in the United States, there is probably a welfare loss 
associated  with inflation-induced distortions in the use of inside  money.  It is 
not appropriate, however, to measure the welfare loss as the area A+B under the 
demand curve for inside money as illustrated in figure 2. 
The income velocity of the monetary base was approximately 19 in 1990. 
Assuming the real interest rate, r, to be 3.5 percent, and the semi-elasticity 
of  money demand to be 5, the reduction in the deadweight loss that would occur 
from eliminating  a 4 percent inflation  rate is approximately 0.064  percent of  GNP 
each year. 
This is seemingly a small amount,  but one  must remember these are only the 
one-year savings.  By  going to zero inflation and staying there, the savings 
would also include the present discounted value of all future savings.  If the 
long-run  income  elasticity of  money demand is approximately 1.0, the  benefit will 
grow approximately one  - f  or  -  one with the economy.  The present discounted value 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm11 
of the benefits of going to  zero inflation would be b/(r-g) , where g is  the 
growth rate  per year of output. Assuming trend growth in  output is approximately 
2.7 percent per year and the real interest rate is 3.5  percent per year (as 
assumed in the previous section),  the total benefits of a zero inflation policy 
would be about 8.0 percent of current GNP. 
Table 2 shows how the estimate of the welfare gain from going to zero 
inflation  varies with changes in assumptions about the model's  parameters.  The 
semi-elasticity  of interest,  j3,  varies between 3 and 7.  This range encompasses 
the empirical estimates  of the long-run  interest elasticity of the monetary base 
reported in Hoffman and Rasche (1989).  The size of the welfare gain depends 
importantly  on  the real interest  rate and the real growth  rate.  This difference, 
(r-g), is shown in the first column.  We report results for three values of the 
real interest rate and three values of @.  The estimate of the welfare gain 
ranges from 3.1 percent to 28.6 percent of GNP. 
Discussion of Assumptions 
To this point our analysis ignores the fact that eliminating inflation 
depletes tax revenue that must be replaced with some other distorting tax. 
Phelps (1973) notes that Friedman's  rule might not be optimal in a world with 
distortionary taxes.  He argues that the government might find it advantageous 
to collect some revenue through inflation.  Using our estimates of the resource 
costs of inflation (equation [6]),  one can calculate the additional loss that 
occurs per additional dollar of revenue gained through inflation: 
Evaluated at zero inflation,  the loss for each additional dollar gained  by 
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increasing inflation is simply pr/(l-pr).  This implies that at zero inflation, 
every additional dollar of revenue that the government collects via inflation 
costs society an additional 25 cents in social 10~s.'~  At 4  percent inflation, 
the last dollar redistributed  costs society more than 66 cents!  If the marginal 
welfare cost of raising revenue through some source is less than 25 cents,  then 
the inflation tax would not be part of an optimal tax structure. 
Our estimates of the resource costs of inflation  are overstated because we 
do not include the amount of resources society must use to replace the revenue 
that accrues with 4  percent inflation.  Any such estimates are beyond the scope 
of this paper.  We proceed assuming they are negligible,  but recognize that these 
costs should be estimated and included in a full costbenefit analysis. 
Aiyagari (1990) argues that much of the U.  S. currency stock is held in the 
underground economy or by foreigners and,  therefore,  we should not include the 
full amount of the base in our resource cost estimate.''  Assuming, for example, 
that two-thirds  of the monetary base is held by foreigners or the underground 
economy,  effective velocity should be 57 instead of 19.  This would reduce our 
welfare costs by a third. 
However, this assumes that the interest elasticity of base demand is the 
same for everyone.  The benefit of using currency is often the evasion of taxes 
or the avoidance of punishment for breaking the law.  For the inflation rates 
that have historically prevailed in this country,  the use of currency is likely 
to be very insensitive to the interest rate.  Since the measured monetary base 
includes a mixture of these highly inelastic funds and the more interest-elastic 
funds held  for  legitimate  purposes by  U.S.  citizens, the  actual  interest 
elasticity of base demand by aboveground holders of the monetary base must be 
much larger than the level estimated using the actual measured base.  If that 
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part of the monetary base held by foreigners and by the underground economy is 
completely insensitive to  the  interest rate, then adjusting the size of the 
monetary base downward to  exclude this portion causes a proportional upward 
adjustment in the estimated interest elasticity.  Using equation (6)  with  a 
proportional  increase  in velocity  and  the  interest elasticity  leads  to  an 
in the estimate of the benefits of price stability.  The present value 
of the shoe-leather  savings  rises from 8.0  percent to 10.3  percent of  GNP for our 
base case when we assume the income velocity of money is equal to 57 and the 
semi-elasticity  of money demand is 15. 
IV.  Conclusions 
In  summary,  estimates of both the resource costs and benefits associated 
with  disinflation can vary  widely depending on the assumptions used  in  the 
analysis.  The costs of an actual disinflation  policy would range anywhere from 
something quite low if policy were credible and announced in advance to a high 
of around 15 percent of GNP.  A  comparison of the estimates in tables 1 and 2 
shows that the transition costs of a disinflation policy from 4  percent to zero 
are in the same  ballpark as the expected  benefits of  reducing  shoe-leather  costs. 
Our point is not to argue that these costs are identical,  or even that one is 
greater than the other,  but merely to show that they are probably of the same 
order of magnitude. 
A  measure of resources is not always a good measure of welfare.  The 
resource costs of ending inflation are identical to the welfare costs of ending 
inflation if individuals  care only about  consumption  and if the resulting losses 
are borne equally by all members of society.  Clearly, the first assumption is 
false. Using a  model that includes  both consumption  and leisure in  utility would 
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imply that the welfare costs of ending inflation are smaller than the resource 
costs.  The second assumption is also clearly not true.  On average, those who 
become unemployed lose much more than those who  keep their jobs. This  would tend 
to make the resource costs of eliminating inflation  less than the welfare costs. 
Thus, our measure of the costs of reducing inflation may either understate or 
overstate the actual welfare costs. 
Our measure of the resource costs of ongoing inflation is derived from a 
partial  equilibrium analysis.  One  would  prefer, however, a  full  general 
equilibrium measure of these costs.  Gillman (1990) and Benabou (1991)  , in a 
discussion of Cooley and Hansen (1991),  both argue that partial equilibrium 
measures  (the  area under  the  money  demand  curve)  will  be  less  than  those 
estimated in a general equilibrium model with a cash-in-advance  constraint.  A 
formal  welfare analysis requires a general equilibrium  model that can  explain  why 
ending inflation is costly and why people prefer zero inflation. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the transition costs of ending 
inflation,  a major obstacle to monetary policy reform, are approximately equal 
to  the  shoe-leather benefits  of having  price  stability.  Summers  (1991) 
convincingly argues that the shoe-leather  costs of inflation  pale in comparison 
to other costs.  The  most important  measurable costs are those resulting from the 
interaction of inflation  with our nominal tax system.  Indexing does not seem to 
be  a practical way to  solve the problem.  For example, despite the  indexing 
provisions contained in the Economic Recovery Act of 1981,  Altig and Carlstrom 
(1991b) estimate that bracket creep reduces steady-state  output by 1.25  percent 
when the inflation trend is 4  percent.  Bracket creep is the process by which 
inflation  pushes  individuals  into  higher  tax  brackets.  If  steady-state 
consumption  also falls by 1.25 percent, then this resource cost of inflation is 
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more than 100 times larger than our estimate of the shoe-leather  costs. 
An even larger distortion occurs because we tax nominal interest income. 
Altig and Carlstrom  (1991a) estimate that this practice reduces steady-state 
output by nearly 5 percent when the inflation  trend is 4  percent.  Again, these 
costs clearly swamp both  the  shoe-leather costs of maintaining a 4  percent 
inflation trend and the transition costs of ending inflation. 
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1.  See Summers (1991) for a recent statement of this argument. 
2.  See,  for example, Blinder (1987), chapter 2. 
3.  See Data Resources, Inc. (1979), which predicts 8 percent inflation for the 
next decade.  The Consumer Price Index rose 7.6 percent in 1978 and 11.3 percent 
in 1979. 
4.  See Hoey (1989) for a list of the survey results going back to 1978. 
5.  See Blanchard and Summers (1986). 
6.  For the same reason that including investment expenditures represents a form 
of double counting, so will  including durable goods  in our measure of lost 
consumption.  Since we do not have a good measure of the flow of services from 
durable goods,  we decided to err on the side  of  making these costs appear larger. 
7.  See Bailey (1956) for an early exposition of the welfare costs associated 
with inflation. A loss remains at zero inflation  because,  as Friedman (1969)  has 
argued, the optimal rate of inflation is achieved when prices fall at the real 
rate of interest so that the nominal interest  rate is zero.  This paper does not 
attempt to argue that zero,  per se, is optimal. 
8.  This number is in line with those obtained by Fischer (1981).  He estimates 
that a 10 percentage point decline in inflation would produce benefits of 0.3 
percent of GNP.  With our formula,  we also obtain savings approximately  equal to 
0.3 percent per year.  Fischer's  estimates were obtained assuming that base 
demand is of the constant elasticity form,  ln(m)  - a +  ln(y)  -  bln(i). 
9.  See Hallman,  Porter, and Small (1991) as well as Hoffman and Rasche (1989) 
for evidence that  the  long-run income elasticity of money  demand  is unity. 
Hoffman and Rasche present results for the monetary base. 
10.  Marty  (1976),  using a constant elasticity form of base demand, estimated 
that the additional deadweight loss per dollar of revenue gained equals ai/(i- 
a)  .  Using Fischer's  (1981) estimate (see footnote 1)  that the elasticity of 
money demand is approximately 0.25,  at zero inflation societywould  also lose 25 
cents  per extra dollar of revenue gained.  See also Barro and Fischer (1976) and 
McCallum (1989) for a  discussion of this issue. 
11.  See Avery et al. (1987) for information about the distribution of currency 
among alternative users. 
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a  Consumption  just returns to the 2.9% trend in 1985 and then 
falls below the trend in 1986 and 1987.  We assume the cost of 
the disinflation is over in 1985.  Consumption returns to the 
2.5% trend in 1984. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Appendix 1 
From equation (I),  individuals choose the number of trips to the bank,  n,  such 
that 
Solving the above equation for i and substituting m for Y/2n yields a general 
form  of  the Baumol money demand function.  The  benefit of  going to zero inflation 
is the area under the money demand curve from m*(  i-r+n)  to m*(  i-r) : 
With a simple change of variables, this equals 
which is simply the savings in shoe-leather  costs associated with going from an 
inflation rate of n to zero. 
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Appendix 2 
From equation (3),  the benefit of going to zero inflation is 
Integrating the above expression and using equation  (3) yields  the following 
welfare gain: 
Rearranging terms, we get 
l+pr~m  - xm*  (i=r+x)  .  B 
Since the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate is 
Constant  , 
Substituting from equation (A2.5) into expression (A2.3) and defining V - Y/m 
yields equation (5) in the text (Y enters because b is stated as a fraction of 
GNP) . 
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